The US Air Force stages fighter and other aircraft at main operating bases at central locations across the globe to gain efficiencies in operations, maintenance, and security.
Illustrations
Upon receipt of the order, an Air Force noncommissioned officer reports to a hardened ground control station (GCS) capable of surviving a direct hit from nuclear munitions. Once there, he launches a swarm of relatively small and inexpensive, yet highly specialized remotely piloted vehicles (RPV). The specialized RPVs, known as Remote Surface Survey Assessment Vehicles (RSSAV), are equipped with sensors and scientific instruments to find, survey, and assess locations for dispersed manned fighter, cargo, and drone aircraft take-offs and landings.
At the dispersed locations, the necessary rearming, refueling, and maintenance of the fighter, cargo, or drone aircraft can take place. A proven multipurpose platform, the RSSAV's various scientific instruments were used across the globe throughout the previous decade building cultural ties by conducting soil testing and evaluation as part of agricultural management efforts during regional stability operations and humanitarian crises. The RSSAV can transition from humanitarian operations to a combat application by operating a switch.
Meanwhile, a networked space sensor sends information to a GCS outlining multiple paved highways and roads that intelligence analysts identified as meeting the minimum length and width requirements for aircraft operations. The RSSAVs automatically adjust their flight paths to the identified potential dispersal airfields. Once over the potential dispersal airfield, a RSSAV conducts low-level flights and uses a high-definition camera to search for obstructions along the road. Other RSSAVs land to provide security and establish road blocks. After determining the road is clear of hazards, the RSSAV takes precise measurements of the length and width of the road. The section of road identified is more than 8000 feet (ft) long and in excess of 75 ft width, which is within the runway minimums required for most fighter aircraft. 2 If there is minor damage to the road, the RSSAV repairs it by dispensing a quick drying epoxyresin material. For extensive damage to the road, the RSSAV prints airfield-grade matting tiles using a 3D printer.
On the ground, the RSSAV conducts a series of field tests to further assess if the location is suitable for air operations. 3 One scientific instrument, the Electronic Cone Penetrometer, hydraulically penetrates through the concrete or asphalt, as well as the underlying soil layers 5 to 7 ft into the earth. A data-linked computer measures the cone tip and sleeve pressure readings, and the information obtained is correlated to California Bearing Ratio value to determine the empirical measure of soil strength. Another scientific instrument tests the earth to classify the soil type and consistency of the various layers.
After performing tests at the specified points along the road and clearing the area of foreign object debris, the RSSAV signals the location is suitable for dispersed airfield operations.
The RSSAV remains on the ground as acts as an air traffic control beacon and navigational aid to alert the inbound fighters where to land. As the missiles strike Anderson AFB, and other Pacific bases, COMPACAF prepares to execute the air tasking order with America's fleet of aircraft that survived the missile attack safely away from the main operating base at the dispersed locations.
The introductory story illustrates that the ability to conduct air operations away from main operating bases and at dispersed locations will be a critical enabler in the Air Force's ability to project power by 2040. In doing so, US forces will be able to operate closer to the areas near a potential adversary or humanitarian situation. Furthermore, dispersed operations complicates an adversary's ability to find and target US aircraft, which promotes increased survivability in a highly contested environment. As such, this paper argues that investments in a multipurpose remotely operated vehicle, outfitted with scientific and other instruments, which can conduct assessments and survey potential improvised Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARP), would present multiple advantages to a US air strategy of dispersing airfield operations and aircraft staging in a contested environment. It is along this thread that this paper will discuss an overview of the strategic problems air planners encounter when evaluating ways to project power in highly contested environments, as well as discuss operational challenges concerning air operations over extended distances from main staging bases outside the probable mission area.
An Overview of the Strategic Problem
In looking forward to the potential realities the US military will encounter by the year 2040, one variable is viewed as a certainty-the US will enter a period of increased constraints on US military actions abroad. Compounding that reality is US military power will continue to compete in shared environments that are evolving and more-complicated as additional nations and nation-states across the globe develop their own advanced military capabilities, and at times, engage in provocative behaviors. These shared spaces are in all domains, to include space, air, cyber, and the sea.
According to The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), the essential access challenge for the future is to be able to project military force and power into an operational area and sustain it in the "face of armed opposition by increasingly capable enemies when US overseas defense posture is changing and space and cyberspace are becoming increasingly important and contested domains." 4 Consequently, the JOAC argues, as competition increases, the US military will likely be required to stage and operate, not from forward areas close to the front lines of the operating location, but rather further from the problem and within the global commons areas.
In the Pacific, China, for example, has been rapidly modernizing its military.
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Investments include weapons and other programs intended to improve extended-range power projection capabilities, to include developments in space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare.
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Short and long range missiles and submarines are the two main thrusts of the modernization aimed at denying access to regional sea and aerial lines of communication. The Pentagon referred to China's investments as creating "the most active land-based ballistic-and cruise- World War Two, modern day advancements in air refueling and the extended range of precision missiles place "rearward" basing at risk. 10 As such, the ability to extend the distance from the likely mission area in order to project power from range is also being highly challenged.
An Overview of the Operational Challenges
Power projection in the future will not resemble the operational construct of 2015.
Currently, air operations in the permissive threat environments over Iraq and Afghanistan have benefited from the Air Force being able to forward deploy and base fighters at main operating bases within close proximity to the fight. Conversely, contested threat environments, such as the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) systems currently being developed and employed by potential future adversaries, such as the Chinese, challenge the Air Forces' ability to project power from forward deployed airfields in the Pacific. While staging fighter aircraft at a main operating base offers certain efficiencies in maintenance and security, these bases also become lucrative targets.
In fact, China's Joint Anti-Air Raid Campaign centers on fielding capabilities and operations to attack adversary airbases and aircraft carriers. 11 Massing air forces at one location comes with operational and security risks if the main operating base is attacked.
Alternatively, power projection from distant bases present additional challenges.
According to a 1999 RAND study, USAF combat aircraft probably could not sustain intense combat operations, defined as one sortie per day per aircraft, over a distance of more than about 2,000 nautical miles (nmi), even if supported with air refueling. RAND also found that aircraft cruising at 500 knots would require approximately eight hours to complete a 2,000-nmi mission.
RAND concluded missions over such as distance would take too much time to meet the requirements for sustained combat operations. Further, RAND determined that fighter aircraft and crews would likely experience fatigue after conducting these extremely lengthy missions. Hanoi, North Vietnam, required a pilot to fly nearly three thousand miles and encapsulated eight hours of flight time. 16 The previously referenced RAND study findings, as well as recent examples highlights that while US pilots are capable of boldly and bravely conducting air operations over distance, there is risk of fatigue over time. Further, the ability to sustain sortie generation from main operating bases to locations over extended distance presents certain operational risk due to the amount of flying time required from takeoff to landing.
Main operating bases for US air operations are priority targets for potential adversaries and will be at risk of attacks that will disrupt sortie generation. According to author Christopher Centner, war planners for Operation DESERT STORM included options to target and render inoperable all of Iraq's suitable airbases. 17 Centner further stated planners set criteria to evaluate if a particular airbase was sufficiently damaged or destroyed post-attack to assess if additional attacks were prudent. This information was used to determine sortie requirements for strike aircraft at three nearby bases were placed on a 7 minute response alert. 20 The B-52 strike package subsequently flew into an air defense network ready to shoot them down.
A key takeaway from these examples is an understanding and acknowledgement that US air operations are studied, and many times copied or incorporated in adversary war planning. As such, if the US builds campaign plans to attack and render ineffective established airfields, it is likely adversaries and potential adversaries have similar plans to attack established airfields.
An operational concept to project power while enabling and sustaining freedom of movement outside the current main operating base construct is through dispersal of air operation locations. Consistent with Admiral Charles Turner Joy's rule of war, "We cannot expect the enemy to oblige by planning his wars to suit our weapons; we must plan our weapons to fight war where, when, and how the enemy chooses." 21 Consequently, dispersing small numbers of fighter aircraft to various expeditionary or improvised airfields can mitigate some risk associated with staging numerous aircraft at a main operating base. Further, this concept would complicate
Chinese targeting of airpower capabilities, reduce pilot fatigue, and improve fighter survivability.
The Strategic Importance of Dispersed Airfields
Early airpower theorists, to include Italian Gen Douhet, recognized the strategic value and risk associated with staging large quantities of airplanes at main operating bases. "It is easier and more effective," Douhet argued, "to destroy the enemy's aerial power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than to hunt his flying birds in the air." 22 Originally published in 1921, his metaphor highlights the extreme vulnerability of aircraft on the ground. Alternatively, the Japanese were unable to target the dispersed Navy carrier fleet. George and his planners concluded that attacking the German air bases individually would not be decisive, as the airbases were "well dispersed" and heavily defended. 25 The inability to attack the dispersed airbases led the planners to target the Lutfwaffe while the airplanes were under construction and remained at the factories. The same was true for the oil products that fueled the German war machine. According to author Tami Davis Biddle, US and British air planners were unsuccessful in their attempts to target oil as the path to reach a key German weakness as the Germans were "likely to disperse their oil production or to find substitutes for it." 26 Author
Conflicts between Arab nations and
Robert Pape argued that "opponents can reduce the effects" of targeting military strength through dispersing important items and materials. 27 Technological advances have increased an adversary's ability to target multiple airbases over distance. As such, modern Air Forces, such as Taiwan, Sweden, and Belarus, employ dispersed tactics for air operations. 28 Of note, these countries have launched and recovered third and fourth generation aircraft, to include F-16s, MiG-29s, and Su-25s from highways. For example, the Taiwanese Air Force annually practices take-offs and landings from improvised sections of a highway during Exercise "Han Kuang." 29 Ground crews also practice rearming munitions and refueling at these dispersed locations.
According to J. Michael Cole, the Taiwanese Government understands that the first phase of a Chinese missile attack would target Taiwan's air bases, so alternates are necessary. 30 While acknowledging that dispersed air operations would be a major disruption to the standard business practices experienced today, countries such as Taiwan recognize that failure to consider and implement alternatives to air operations from main operating bases in highly contested environments comes with risk to aircraft survivability and sortie generation. platform to operate and maintain fighter operations forward of the main operating base. 34 Using any suitable existing airfield across the globe, including civilian fields in austere environments, the C-17 forward deploys maintenance personnel, munitions, and fuel to rearm, repair, and refuel F-22s for continued operations. 35 In the Pacific, up to 258 civilian airfields may be suitable for fighter operations. 36 As necessary, the C-17 can also deliver rested F-22 aircrews to enable uninterrupted operations. A key element of the Rapid Raptor concept is the ability to overcome logistics challenges and maintenance requirements away from a main operating base, and successfully transport the requisite supplies to enable fighter refueling and rearming at a suitable FARP airfield. 37 However, a fundamental limitation of the Rapid Raptor concept is its use of established airfields at civilian airports as the main criteria to be a viable fighter FARP location. This limitation is based on the assumption that if the US builds campaign plans to attack and render ineffective established airfields, which would include civilian airfields, it is likely adversaries and potential adversaries have similar plans.
Rapid Raptor: Optimized
The unpredictability of utilizing established civilian airfields for Rapid Raptor will provide substantial benefits in terms of operational flexibility and deterrent value for US planners. What complicates the situation, however, is that the Chinese and other potential adversaries are well aware of the 258 identified civilian airfields. As such, a course of action for
China would be to preemptively target all the identified civilian airfields to deny US aircraft the opportunity to use them. However, even if China did not conduct preemptive strikes against the established civilian airfields, in classic kill chain speak, if an adversary can find US forces, or know where those forces may operate from, then those forces and the associated airfields are at risk of being targeted.
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Technology has increased the risk of operating from known locations. For example, technological advancements in an adversaries ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination paired with global communications have reduced the sensor-to-shooter kill chain from days or hours to mere minutes. 39 In that light, even if a potential adversary's war planners are unable to predict which established civilian airfield will be used for US air operations, the adversary may have sufficient early warning capacity near the established airfields, as well as the necessary time to intercept aircraft approaching one or more of the civilian airfields. Preexisting early warning capabilities, such as human informants living in cities near established civilian airfields, would also provide an enemy time to take military action to render the civilian airfields inoperable.
US Government analysts have confirmed the growing technical early warning capabilities of China. In a 2013 report to the US Congress, the Depart of Defense stated that China has developed a national integrated air defense system to protect mainland China, and analyzed that expansion of its national early warning network to protect territorial air, space, and waters farther from the mainland is probable. 40 A worst case scenario is that US air planners incorrectly assume that these established civilian airfields will be available and serviceable for FARP operations. 41 As such, this data highlights the requirement to develop an alternative plan for more unpredictable dispersed air operations. The Chinese have multiple arrows in their respective quivers in which to target and render US runways inoperable. Although cruise missiles or other standoff weapons are a primary focus of discussion as they may be launched to disable all or some of the civilian airfields, a more cost effective means to degrade the airfields would be through human saboteurs.
With only 258 civilian airfields, this low number of aim points would fit within estimates of the future quantity of Chinese missiles, and are a reasonably actionable number of missions for intelligence agents or special operations forces armed with explosive devices to crater portions of the runway. Potentially more frustrating is that an undetectable, and low cost solution, would be for the saboteurs to emerge from the civilian populous near the civilian airfields and break apart portions of the runway simply using a pick axe and a shovel. With a population over one billion, China has sufficient capacity to recruit an unsophisticated network of agents to conduct human intelligence reporting and to engage in saboteur operations if the need arises.
In order to further complicate the planning of Chinese and other potential adversaries, and improve US probability of locating and conducting air operations closer to the fight, the US must have a capability that enables air operations from more unpredictable locations. A network of remotely operated vehicles capable of conducting assessments of paved roads, or other nontraditional surfaces meeting the minimum requirements for air operations would increase the probability of successful refueling and rearming in a highly contested environment. If the US can shorten the distance and flight time associated with air operations conducted from main operating bases through refitting, refueling, and rearming at improvised locations closer to the fight, and those locations remain unknown to a potential adversary, the strategic value of an operational concept such as Rapid Raptor can be optimized. In order to determine the requirements necessary to optimize this promising operational concept, it is first necessary to review the process by which the Air Force conducts surveys and assessments of airfields.
A Review of Air Force Airfield Survey and Assessment Capabilities
The US Air Force's airfield survey and assessment capability is currently sized, equipped, and trained to operate in permissive environments. 43 The 
Figure 6. Airfield Evaluation Procedures
For contingency operations in a permissive environment, the CRG Airfield Assessment
Team will forward deploy in preparation to establish and control air operations. 45 46 A chief complaint is that the engineering testing process is "slow, and low tech." 47 The team is expected to complete the initial airfield survey within four hours, and be ready to receive aircraft within 24 hours.
Other Constraints
There are a limited number of available US airfield survey teams. Additionally, the associated cost of transporting multiple teams to conduct airfield surveys is a concern to air planners. AMCI 10-202V4 acknowledges that "airfield surveys can be very costly in terms of 49 In addition, carrier-based aircrews in the eastern Mediterranean found themselves in a position where Turkey's denial of the use of its airspace complicated matters further by limiting their ability to strike targets from the sea. 50 Faced with these constraints, the Air Force should pursue a technology-based alternative to find and survey suitable FARP locations in contested environments.
Opportunities for Technological Investment
An optimized Rapid Raptor concept to conduct an improvised airfield survey should consist of a remotely piloted vehicle equipped with a mobile analytical survey lab similar to the scientific capabilities found on a NASA space rover. For example, the NASA rover Curiosity that deployed to Mars in 2012 is equipped with a laboratory that includes the Sample Analysis at Mars suite and the Chemistry and Mineralogy instrument. 51 The Curiosity holds ten instruments weighing 165 pounds in a package that is under 10 feet in length. NASA invested $2.5 billion total in the program, including almost two billion in research and development. 52 Similarly capable scientific instruments furnished on a RSSAV, which would be comparable in size to a Predator drone, can analyze surface material and determine suitability for air operations. At locations where the soil and terrain is suitable, yet lacks the required length or width of a hard surface, such as concrete or asphalt, the RSSAV could dispense quick drying epoxyresin to fill in craters, or 3D print tiles of airfield matting meeting the specifications required for fighter aircraft take-offs and landings. The Air Force and Marine Corps have used expeditionary airfield matting since World War Two, and it is a proven capability for fighter aircraft to successfully take off and land at improvised FARP sites. When no longer needed at a specific location, the matting can be recovered and relocated to another FARP location. Of note, dispersed airfield surface areas that are both hard and smooth are required for fighter takeoffs due to the extremely high tire pressure ratings and light landing gear struts found on many fighter jets. 55 The RSSAV overcomes the FARP survey and assessment capability gap for contested environments. In effect, the RSSAV can be equipped to accomplish each role of a traditional human airfield assessment team restricted to operating in permissive environments. 56 As such, the RSSAV not only solves the survey capability limitation, it also eliminates risk to the assessment teams and the teams operating delivery vehicles. In this light, the RSSAV concept to optimize airfield survey teams while reducing the risk to Air Force personnel is consistent with Gen Hap Arnold's foresight towards seeking an alternative to fighting wars with people. Gen
Arnold said, "It is a fundamental principle of democracy that personnel casualties are distasteful.
We will continue to fight mechanical rather than manpower wars." 57 However, this concept is more than simply adding a new gadget or platform to the military inventory.
It is in the application of the technology within the concept, and combining it with other systems within available systems, where power projection can be elevated. According to Max
Boot, "The key to success is not just inventing or buying a new technology, but also in how you harness it." Boot continued, an example is in how Germany integrated the technological advances in tanks, aircraft, and communications, and invented the blitzkrieg, a new way of mechanized warfare that "revolutionized war in the twentieth century." 58 France and Britain also had similar military tools, yet failed to transform their militaries and strategies in ways comparable to the Germans. The incorporation of a RSSAV in support of air missions to locate improvised dispersal airfield locations optimizes the Air Force's ability to project power in highly contested environments. Continued investments in road infrastructure are projected in the near and long term, as there is a key linkage between continued investments in highways to a stronger Asian economy. 61 Specifically, the Asian manufacturing sector is reliant on efficient and reliable roads between ports, factories, and consumer markets. The road linkage between production to distribution locations enhances the movement of marketplace goods, services, and people throughout Asia, and contributes to increased transactions across borders.
Evaluating the Potential of Asian Highways as Improvised Dispersal Airfields
Continued economic progress throughout Asia is linked to a modernized highway infrastructure. As such, the availability of suitable surface materials throughout Asia for dispersal airfields will increase by 2040. According to the Wall Street Journal, expressways in China alone total 46,000 miles (74,000 km), approximately the same amount of miles as found in the US interstate system. 62 China's Ministry of Transport forecasts that by 2020, China will have 85,000 km of national expressways. Air planners would be well served to exploit this opportunity and use these improved roads as dispersal airfields in order to project power in highly contested environments.
Humanitarian Power Projection in Highly-Contested Environments
The US military will continue to enable the projection of diplomatic or economic power in highly contested humanitarian situations. In response to natural disasters, crises derived from internal conflict, or regional instability, the US military has an expanding role in humanitarian aid assistance. Outfitting the RSSAV with sensors and other capabilities to assist in agricultural efforts during stability operations enhances this concept through development of a multirole platform, and further optimizes power projection.
Unmanned aerial systems are currently used by farmers to conduct assessments of crop and agricultural lands. These low-cost remotely piloted vehicles can be programmed to hover or fly over fields and data link digital videos or photos to a location on the ground, where the images can be sequenced together to show terrain features or analyzed to measure crop health.
The drone vehicles can also be modified to land and take soil and water samples. 65 Christopher
Doering from the USA Today reported the price tag on agricultural drones range in cost from $2,000 for a platform that an individual farmer can assemble to around $160,000 for a military- 68 An RSSAV outfitted with multipurpose scientific instruments can have a huge impact on building cultural ties between the US and key partner nations.
Opportunities for Deception Operations
Deception operations are a cornerstone of military strategy. 69 The Luftwaffe dedicated significant attention to airfield attacks during the Battle of Britain. As part of their airbase defense strategy, the Royal Air Force constructed decoy bases near their main operating bases.
Initially using little more than lamps to suggest airfield markers, the decoy initiative later incorporated moving damaged airplanes to the decoy fields so German battle damage assessments would report successful strikes. In all, the Germans conducted over 440 raids against the dummy airfields, as compared to approximately 430 strikes targeting operational units. 70 In a modern era where electronic signatures can be intercepted and platform type and locations identified through the electronic spectrum, another mission for RSSAV could be to maneuver to dispersal locations in order to broadcast the electronic characteristics of a more locations. This concept adds value to the discussion on identifying ways to increase aircraft survivability.
Conclusions
In summary, this paper discussed an overview of the strategic problems air planners encounter when evaluating ways to project power in highly contested environments, and outlined the operational challenges concerning air operations over extended distances from main staging bases outside the probable mission area. Examples in wars since World War Two illustrate how sustaining sortie generation from main operating bases to locations over extended distance presents certain operational risk due to the amount of flying time required from takeoff to landing, as well as the possibility of pilot fatigue over time. Further, massing aircraft at a main operating base has strategic risk as air planners such as Gen Douhet assess targeting airfields as the easiest and most efficient way to destroy an enemy's air capabilities.
An alternative is to disperse air operations, which affords certain advantages; however, 
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The 2015 US National Security Strategy outlines a requirement to have the capabilities to assure access to the arteries of the global shared spaces, or global common areas. 72 In doing so, the US assumes a leading role in enabling the free flow of people, goods, services, and ideas that serve as the cornerstone to the security of a global economy and civil society. Innovative military solutions to address and overcome these challenges are needed, especially as strategists explore alternative options to conducting air operations from main operating bases over extended distance. The ability to conduct air operations from dispersed locations closer to a potential adversary or humanitarian situation, while complicating an adversary's ability to find and target one's own aircraft during a conflict, is a critical enabler in the Air Force's ability to project power by 2040. 
